In the United States, a debate is ongoing regarding the military's obligation to obey civilian leadership. Some argue that military leaders may have an ethical duty to resist certain extraordinary orders, even if those orders are not clearly illegal. Critics, including military experts, contend that the military's obligation to obey legal orders is absolute, citing three main objections to the idea of permissible disobedience.

The first objection concerns the inherent risks associated with military power, which can be used to achieve political goals. This unique capability poses a potential threat to civilian governance, making it essential for the military to remain obedient to elected officials. Any divergence between military and civilian authority could lead to catastrophic outcomes.

The second objection emphasizes the principle of political neutrality, which dictates that the military must adhere to lawful orders to maintain its nonpartisan status. In democratic societies, the authority to determine government policy rests with elected representatives, and the military must comply with their directives, regardless of personal disagreements.

The third objection posits that allowing military personnel to choose which orders to follow introduces personal moral and political beliefs into military operations, undermining the legitimacy of political processes that govern military conduct.

These objections reflect a conventional interpretation of political neutrality that the author challenges. The author argues that political neutrality should also encompass a commitment to defend civil society against threats from civilian authorities. Recent political events have highlighted instances where civilian leaders may pose risks to civil society and military neutrality, suggesting that a passive adherence to lawful orders does not necessarily enhance national security.

The concept of civil-military relations, as articulated by theorist Peter Feaver, centers on military obedience to civilian authority. Feaver's framework addresses the civil-military problematic, which recognizes that while militaries are designed to protect society, they also pose risks to it. This dynamic necessitates civilian control to prevent military interference in political matters.

However, the author contends that Feaver's analysis overlooks the unique dangers posed by a standing military in democratic contexts. The military's power can be wielded by any authority, whether democratic or autocratic, creating potential threats to civil society. The historical context of U.S. civil-military relations underscores the importance of aligning military loyalty with the Constitution rather than individual officeholders.

The author argues that the military's oath of office emphasizes allegiance to the Constitution, which serves as a safeguard against the misuse of military power by elected officials. This distinction is crucial in ensuring that military personnel prioritize the protection of civil society over blind obedience to political leaders.

In light of these considerations, the author asserts that military personnel may have a duty to resist orders that threaten civil society, even if such orders are legally sanctioned. Resistance can take various forms, including raising objections, seeking clarification, or even resigning from service. The ethical implications of such resistance are complex and context-dependent, requiring service members to navigate the potential consequences of their actions.

Ultimately, the article calls for a reevaluation of the civil-military relationship in democratic societies, emphasizing that military neutrality should not equate to uncritical obedience to civilian authority. The potential for civilian leaders to misuse military power necessitates a framework where military personnel can ethically resist orders that undermine the principles of democracy and civil society.